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Abstract 
This paper recognizes vested interests as one of the primary premises that reduce 
the effectiveness of privatization policy, stall its momentum and produce structural 
problems in the long-run. Both exogenous and endogenous drawbacks are cited, but 
the main focus is put on the dynamism of vested interests’ character, 
interconnectedness and evolution. Policy makers have been long aware of the 
existence of activities rooted in vested interests including empire building behaviors, 
creation of sinecures or extravagant management style. Hence, the fundamental 
effort here is put on the identification of emerging vested interests that were typically 
not considered by scholars. The channels through which conventional vested 
interests have snowballed over time are emphasized. This includes casting a closer 
glance at family employment, as well as at sports sponsorship arrangements, which 
emerge as the favorite domain of marketing activity for Polish state-owned 
enterprises. The research of available literature is performed, along with its 
application to the Polish case, and insightful observations concerning the anatomy 
of privatization-related reluctance. Rough policy recommendations conclude the 
paper. 
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Introduction 
The principal goal of the paper is to perform an in-depth investigation into the 
character of privatization-related vested interests that hamper the pace and depth of 
ownership transformation. The case of Poland is used as an example, both because 
of its familiarity to the author, and the presence of phenomena that are tackled in this 
paper, the pervasiveness of which may have been observed throughout recent 
years. Vested interests were of course perceptible throughout consecutive stages of 
privatization in Poland from its very beginning, but the evidence here is designed 
rather to illustrate the contemporary struggle to overcome the residual resistance. 
The term “vested interests” embodies various political interests expressed by 
individuals or groups, deriving rents from a given state-owned entity and capable of 
forming pressure aimed at the preservation of status quo, which is favorable for 
them, but which puts taxpayers at a disadvantage. Another interesting frame for the 
notion of vested interests has been presented in Krusell and Rios-Rull (1996) who 
studied political obstacles to technological innovations. They depict this 
phenomenon by the incumbents blocking the emergence of novelties by influencing 
the regulatory process. 
There are undoubtedly some merits behind the government’s presence in the 
corporate world and the intention of this article is neither to analyze its legitimacy, 
accuracy and effectiveness, nor to argue in favor of privatization’s inherent value. In 
fact, as Hertog (2010) proved for the Persian Gulf monarchies, it would be too bold 
to make an identity relationship between public ownership and ineffectiveness. It is 
equally troublesome to infer high-level consequences of too much state in the 
economy, given the plethora of intermediate variables, differences in initial 
conditions and adopted development models. It is also ambiguous what 
consequences political connectedness has for companies involved in political 
campaigns (See Newton and Uysal, 2013). 
Hence, instead of seeking strict evidence for the ineffectiveness of state-owned 
enterprises (later referred to as SOEs), this paper rather relies on a generic, primitive 
assumption that private property in the broad economy is more effective than public 
property. The paper is solely to stress that there is a number of supplementary 
motivations that derail SOEs from their shareholder value-oriented regime and make 
policy makers not cut the umbilical cord that feeds them with generous governmental 
perks. At the same time, being aware of the consequences of flawed state ownership 
is important as it attests to the importance of this article. First, vested interests and 
rent seeking behaviors can distort the economic efficiency of policy design and 
implementation in the domain of management of economic resources (Jamasb, 
2006:24). Second, they might have prolonged consequences for the level of 
development of the private sector and financial markets (Roland, 2001). Third, 
protracted privatization may have insidious influence on public finance, leading to its 
sub-optimal structure and putting off necessary reforms. A certain sort of extra 
income dependency can be observed, meaning that the government takes yearly 
privatization revenue for granted, treating it as filling material for budget deficit (see 
e.g. Iimi, 2003). Henceforth, gradual and sluggish privatization postpones the need 
to introduce substantial, but openly disliked policy shifts. With swift privatization, 
government would be injected with a one-off cash boost, but in the coming years 
more courageous policies would have to be implemented. 
Rosa and Pérard (2010) stress that privatization-related literature is concentrated 
around two central subject matters: optimal privatization methods and efficiency gap 
between SOEs and private companies. Particularly, the ideological component that 
drives decision makers is unexploited. Although there is a broad literature also on 
the motivation of political actors to privatize or externalities associated with 
privatization, there is still a considerable deficit in comprehending the inhibitors to 
ownership transformation. Naturally, the political dimension is recognized and the 
political theory of privatization is developed in such papers as Boycko, Shleifer and 
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Vishny (1996), Opper (2004) or Bortolotti and Pinotti (2008), but the existing literature 
more often than not adopts a static stance towards interest groups, usually ignoring 
the fact their interests do evolve over time. 
On a statistical note, the history of privatization in Poland dates back to 1981 (the 
introduction of market socialism policy), but it is not before the collapse of communist 
regime in 1989 and pushing through a series of privatization bills until the property 
transformation gathered its momentum (for more extended recapitulation refer e.g. 
to Kowalik, 1991). Between 1990 and 2008, nearly 7,500 (85.4 percent as of 1990) 
state enterprises have been put under some form of privatization. However, this 
figure is remarkably deceiving, as more than every fifth enterprise was just 
‘commercialized’ into ‘sole-shareholder company of the State Treasury’, which is 
quite immaterial alteration as compared with the status of SOE. Moreover, about 
1,000 firms from the (statistical) privatization pool were dissolved, while even more 
than that were handed over to a government-dependent entity, the Agricultural 
Property Agency (See Central Statistical Office in Poland, 2009). 
Naturally, privatization in Poland is by far not a textbook example of perfectly failed 
policy. Tache (2008:12-14) enumerates such patterns, providing an example of her 
own country, Romania, as well as Russia, Bulgaria and Serbia, branding this model 
as a “patrimonial capitalism”. An extreme politicization of the underlying privatization 
schemes led virtually to a disappearance of hidden intrigues and charades, with 
vested interests being overtly displayed instead. For instance, members of the 
Romanian Parliament, sheltered by immunity, did not hesitate to perform managerial 
functions in the SOEs. In Poland, misconduct of such gravity has not been seen. To 
provide a complete picture, however, it is important to add that vested interests 
related to privatization do not necessarily ruin the whole market-oriented effort. For 
instance, as Rondinelli and Yurkiewicz (1996:145) write, ‘the development of small 
and medium-sized enterprises and the spread of entrepreneurial activity were far 
more important than privatization of state enterprises in moving Poland toward a 
market system’. Nevertheless, in some jurisdictions, such as Russia, the spoils 
system determined the quality of transition, and paralyzed market-oriented reforms 
(Moors, 1997; Fischer and Sahay, 2000:21), as ‘the state was easily captured by 
well-organized industrial interests’ (Kapstein and Milanovic, 2000:29). 
The paper is structured as follows. This introduction, containing the very brief outlook 
of privatization-related struggles in Poland, is followed by the discursive chapters on 
exogenous and endogenous sources of vested interests. The borderline between 
them happens to be blurred, but in general the exogenous originate outside the 
domain of policy makers, while the endogenous are rooted in politics. Afterwards, 
the dichotomy between conventional and emerging vested interests is presented, 
the latter being the phenomena that arose relatively recently and have not been so 
far extensively covered by scientific research. What comes next is the illustration of 
the emerging vested interests on the basis of a concise case study carried out with 
regard to the largest Polish SOEs. Policy recommendations and further research 
proposals are derived in the final chapter. 
The paper’s contribution to the literature comes in two forms. First, it firmly introduces 
vested interests as a dynamic phenomenon, whereas the past literature was at best 
agnostic about their nature, or portrayed them as a static occurrence. Second, the 
supportive value of this paper is that it offers a taxonomy of vested interests, not only 
dividing them into conventional vs. emerging, but also into exogenous vs. 
endogenous. The dynamics between these interconnected groups is also presented 
throughout the article.The conclusions may both enrich policy makers’ 
comprehension of vested interests domain, and assist in counteracting the overly 
improper use of political clout. 
As a rough introduction to the insights into exogenous and endogenous sources of 
privatization reluctance, one may review the following chart that should facilitate to 
keep up with the reasoning presented in this article. 
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Figure 1. Exogenous and endogenous sources of privatization reluctance 
 
Source: own taxonomy. 
Exogenous determinants of sluggish privatization 
Although the intention of this paper is more to explore the endogenous dimension of 
privatization-related negligence, the brief recapitulation of exogenous factors is also 
desirable. As Bel and Fageda (2008:6) write, ‘it is commonly assumed that public 
employees and unions are in favor of internal production, while industrial interests 
have a greater preference for privatization’. The privatization effort is indeed quite 
often impeded by the trade unions empowered by directly ‘touched’ employees 
(Warner and Hebdon, 2001; Careja and Emmenegger, 2009). Privatization issues 
are thus still central to positioning strategies espoused by political parties in transition 
states. In aggregate, one should agree with Bortolotti and Faccio (2004:2) remarking 
that there are few stories that document governments privatizing enthusiastically, 
and’most of the news stories depict governments that are faced with stiff opposition 
from many vested interests, but are forced to privatize because of budgetary 
shortfalls’. Hence, exogenous determinants of sluggish privatization are, at least by 
some scholars, seen as dominant and powerful. The table on the next page shows 
the selected data for state-owned entities in OECD economies in 2009. 
Based on the inputs presented in this table, the naïve correlations are as follows 
(figures in brackets indicate the correlation coefficient after excluding Norway, which 
is outstandingly peculiar with its sovereign wealth funds): 
• Employees as percent of population vs. GDP per capita: 0.043 (-0.342) 
• Market value as percent of GDP vs. GDP per capita: 0.372 (0.023) 
• Employees as percent of population vs. Corruption Perception Index: -0.053 (-
0.193) 
• Market value as percent of GDP vs. Corruption Perception Index: 0.180 (0.072) 
• Employees as percent of population vs. Index of Economic Freedom: -0.383 (-
0.431) 
• Market value as percent of GDP vs. Index of Economic Freedom: -0.167 (-0.201) 
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The caveats are particularly that correlation coefficients say nothing about causality 
and that it is a narrow and static approach, as the readily available data do not allow 
for full panel analysis. In fact, in order to advance to a more comprehensive picture, 
instead of having considered listed and non-listed enterprises, one should also 
include the statutory corporations, i.e. the units created by statutes. Although 
Christiansen (2011) has in fact done it, the OECD data set he uses has many non-
negligible blanks. 
Referring to the academic discussion, not everyone had incentives to make key 
industries free from the shackles of communist continuum back in the early 1990s. 
Some, “shock therapists”, worried that if the privatization did not proceed quickly, the 
overwhelming pool of vested interests would stimulate a reversion to socialism. 
Others, ‘gradualists’ were uneasy about hurried reforms, claiming ‘they would be a 
disaster – economic failures compounded by political corruption – opening up the 
way to a backlash’ (Stiglitz, 2002:27). The main arguments of the big bang 
enthusiasts centered around two focal points: detaining asset stripping and 
precluding vested interest groups from blocking privatization later on (Fischer and 
Sahay, 2000:12). Indeed, radical actions seem to be superior to gradual actions 
when it comes to tackling vested interests, since the latter allow ‘defenders of the 
status quo far greater latitude to sabotage reform’ (Megginson and Netter, 1998:29). 
The burden of vested interests tied to the ancien regime was also recognized by 
Earle and Gehlbach (2002:5) who suggested a ‘strong state’ as a firewall against 
this threat. Whereas in the 1990s “shock therapists” received vast support provided 
by an empirical literature, they were finally challenged by “gradualists”, who have 
revisited the models and pointed out their substantial and methodological flaws. 
Overlooking initial conditions and institutional frameworks, and confusing the speed 
and the depth of reforms were the focus of critique (Campos and Coricelli, 2002:51; 
Godoy and Stirlitz, 2006:20).Even Sachs himself admitted afterwards that 
privatization policy prescriptions should contain less ideology, and be rather tailored 
to the country’s characteristics, since while ownership certainly matters, institutional 
infrastructure matters just as much (Estrin et al., 2007:37; Wallsten, 2002; Zinnes, 
Eilat and Sachs, 2001:166). 
The break through periods are inseparably associated with extraordinary policies, 
initiated immediately as the country embarked on transition. First, ‘the magic of the 
moment’ facilitated winning, at low or no cost, public consent for reforms. Second, it 
made it easier to dismantle disorganized vested interests (Earle and Gehlbach, 
2002:6). However, much time has passed since Eastern European societies last had 
an occasion to take advantage of this approach, because the period of extraordinary 
policies has left for good. While at the very beginning of the transition road, the 
reformative enthusiasm and people’s approval of undergoing economic changes 
indeed provided an auspicious environment, it deteriorated quickly after the wrong 
doings of privatization have been gradually made apparent. Members of 
nomenklatura, supposedly most proficient when it came to understanding a 
complicated legal framework, have engaged in ‘spontaneous privatization’ right after 
new economic policies came into effect, and managed to strip ‘some assets of their 
firms through transfer pricing, sweet deals with foreigners, and other plundering 
devices’ (Tirole, 1991:222). Pittance savings of the ordinary population precluded it 
to take its slice of the new shareholding structures. As spotted by Stiglitz (2002:143), 
even if some would be eager to make use of their nest egg to take over an enterprise, 
they would probably not be able to restructure it, given galloping inflation and risk 
averse or infant financing providers. As domestic investment capabilities were 
scarce at the beginning of the 1990s, the immense amounts of state-owned capital 
failed to attract broad masses. 
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Table 1. Statistics of selected OECD member countries in 2009. 
Country 
GDP p.c. 
(PPP) 
000 USD 
Rankings Enterprises majority-owned by the central level of government Relative measures indicating the size of state-owned units Listed Non-listed Total 
CPI IoEF Units Employees Market value Units Employees 
Market 
value Units Employees 
Market 
value 
Employees as  
% of population 
Market value as 
% of GDP 
AUS 41.43 8.7 82.6 0 0 0.0 7 8 283 4.2 7 8 283 4.2 0.04 0.47 
AUT 39.26 7.9 71.2 2 28 741 8.2 6 50 459 7.8 8 79 200 16.0 0.95 4.87 
BEL 36.90 7.1 72.1 1 17 371 13.2 7 74 990 44.6 8 92 361 57.8 0.86 14.51 
CAN 38.63 8.7 80.5 0 0 0.0 33 105 296 21.6 33 105 296 21.6 0.31 1.66 
CHL 15.92 6.7 78.3 1 156 0.2 9 5 559 2.7 10 5 715 2.9 0.03 1.08 
CZE 25.88 4.9 69.4 1 33 000 25.3 82 38 200 9.9 83 71 200 35.2 0.68 12.97 
DNK 38.63 9.3 79.6 0 0 0.0 11 8 680 8.3 11 8 680 8.3 0.16 3.89 
EST 19.98 6.6 76.4 0 0 0.0 32 16 261 2.9 32 16 261 2.9 1.21 10.85 
FIN 35.87 8.9 74.5 3 24 844 29.4 28 61 187 16.3 31 86 031 45.7 1.61 23.86 
FRA 35.11 6.9 63.3 2 176 347 116.1 30 120 386 41.6 32 296 733 157.7 0.47 7.17 
DEU 35.96 8.0 70.5 0 0 0.0 57 66 419 22.9 57 66 419 22.9 0.08 0.78 
HUN 20.44 5.1 66.8 0 0 0.0 346 150 528 6.7 346 150 528 6.7 1.50 3.27 
ISR 27.71 6.1 67.6 0 0 0.0 29 50 264 43.2 29 50 264 43.2 0.67 20.83 
ITA 32.36 4.3 61.4 0 0 0.0 25 289 329 105.4 25 289 329 105.4 0.48 5.38 
KOR 26.22 5.5 68.1 8 39 599 38.3 48 81 056 139.4 56 120 655 177.7 0.24 13.72 
MEX 14.19 3.3 65.8 0 0 0.0 45 n/a 2.2 45 n/a 2.2 n/a 0.14 
NLD 41.16 8.9 77.0 0 0 0.0 28 60 355 74.1 28 60 355 74.1 0.36 10.84 
NZL 29.87 9.4 82.0 1 10 726 0.5 17 17 107 9.1 18 27 833 9.6 0.64 7.36 
NOR 54.61 8.6 70.2 3 74 723 104.7 33 50 479 18.3 36 125 202 123.0 2.56 46.06 
POL 18.79 5.0 60.3 13 184 079 59.5 573 542 082 34.0 586 726 161 93.5 1.89 12.92 
PRT 25.27 5.8 64.9 0 0 0.0 42 81 465 16.6 42 81 465 16.6 0.77 6.21 
SVN 26.93 6.6 62.9 3 3 048 0.9 33 22 276 3.1 36 25 324 4.0 1.24 7.25 
ESP 32.15 6.1 70.1 0 0 0.0 115 106 963 36.3 115 106 963 36.3 0.23 2.45 
SWE 37.29 9.2 70.5 0 0 0.0 43 143 253 66.1 43 143 253 66.1 1.53 18.90 
CHE 46.81 9.0 79.4 1 19 813 19.8 1 7 534 0.7 2 27 347 20.5 0.35 5.59 
GBR 35.36 7.7 79.0 1 160 900 50.7 12 202 668 5.5 13 363 568 56.2 0.59 2.59 
Source: Christiansen, H. (2011) (data-related reservations outlined in this paper apply); Transparency International, http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/cpi_2009; The Heritage 
Foundation & Wall Street Journal, www.heritage.org; OECD, www.stats.oecd.org. CPI stands for the Corruption Perception Index, while IoEF stands for the Index of Economic Freedom.
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Clearly, following the years of communist propaganda according to which the state’s 
property belonged to people, it was problematic to make people satisfied as many of 
them felt empty-handed. Such an inference may be justified on the basis of Pentor’s 
survey about privatization sentiments (see chart below). Nevertheless, the research 
has been ceased after 2004, yet before most recent and highly profitable initial public 
offerings (IPOs) of SOEs have been concluded (Megginson and Bortolotti, 2011), 
and further estimates are not available. Now it seems that a certain reluctance 
prevails if the vested interests of citizens are endangered rather than those of 
politicians. Therefore, ownership transformation is hampered in health care and 
utilities. Nevertheless, it is beyond discussion that privatization is a two-edged sword 
for the state authorities, and some modes of ownership transformation (e.g. 
Czechoslovakia’s voucher scheme, or – more up-to-date – Poland’s IPOs) may 
prove helpful in building up political capital and thus in increasing government’s 
popularity. Privatization of SOEs through the mass enfranchisement of employees 
may also contribute to mitigating the anti-privatization movement within the company 
(Shafik, 1996), but its track record in Central and Eastern Europe is not very 
impressive, presumably due to mentality issues (Castater, 2002:14-20; Kozarzewski, 
2008:257-260). Moreover, the choice of a scheme is tricky as well. Whereas 
Czechoslovak privatization was in fact a ‘give-away to outsiders’ (glorious but 
inefficient), the Russian case was rather a ‘give-away to insiders’ (definitely 
inglorious) according to Roland’s (2000) typology. The search for a golden mean 
continues. 
Figure 2. A survey regularly carried out by Pentor until 2004, in which the question 
asked is: ‘Do you generally support the efforts aimed at privatization of the Polish 
economy?’ 
Source: Ministry of Treasury (2005:279). 
The exogenous sources of policy makers’ reluctance towards privatization are also 
fueled by the prevalent term ‘thievish privatization’, implying that ethical standards 
lag behind the pace of structural transformation. This finding was confirmed by 
Denisova, Eller, Frye and Zhuravskaya (2010:4) who claim that ‘political elites have 
used public sentiment of illegitimacy of privatization to redistribute assets to 
themselves or their supporters’. A similar survey has been conducted for Latin 
America by Checchi, Florio and Carrera (2005), who found out that privatization 
discontents are predominantly poor, live in countries with high income inequalities, 
whereas privatizations in question were large, quick and involved such public utilities 
as water or electricity. Yusuf (2009:73) enumerates a number of “sins” of privatization 
in transition economies, and to name just a few: sales to insiders, asset stripping, 
weak managerial capabilities, limited competition, feeble regulation, all amplified by 
resistance from vested interests. Godoy and Stirlitz (2006:22) hypothesize that the 
countries that embarked on rapid privatizations may suffer from the prolonged 
problem that property rights lack legitimacy in society. The societal approval of the 
pace of economic reforms was underscored by Watts, Walstad and Skiba (2002). 
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State authorities, in fact, tend more to explore the public concerns than to undertake 
education campaigns to minimize them. They usually take public unrest at its face 
value and reinforce it, by emphasizing the argument of allegedly strategic importance 
of particular enterprises or branches, which seems to be a plausible excuse. The 
strategic importance is to some extent reflected in the Polish corporate law. Radwan 
and Regucki (2012:17-18) present the articles of association of PGNiG (a SOE 
dealing with exploration and production of natural gas and crude oil) affirming that 
‘the State may consent to the company taking actions or making investments that 
permanently or temporarily reduce the company’s economic efficiency, but are 
necessary for maintaining the energy security of the country’. This passage instructs 
that the state intervention is rationalized, as it is capable of endorsing social benefit 
at the cost of economic benefit of the corporation. The tensions between the 
commercial and non-commercial nature of SOEs are more thoroughly explored by 
Christiansen (2013). In contrast, Raszewski (2012:130-131) warns that labeling 
something as a security issue (i.e. a strategically important matter) allows for dealing 
with such a problem ‘behind closed doors’. In fact, such a securitization becomes an 
extreme form of politicization. 
However, strategic status may be ascribed only to a fraction of SOEs (e.g. energy 
industry, petroleum industry, rail transport, aviation, shipbuilding, arms industry, coal 
mining industry), whereas still hundreds of enterprises remain de facto isolated from 
stimulating free market mechanisms. This “excuse” is amplified by another. Many 
people are hesitant towards potential buyers, mainly foreign companies, which do 
not take into account Polish national interests. However, the argument of national 
interests is incomplete, as markets deemed strategic are usually strictly supervised 
by domestic regulatory bodies that restrain potentially abusive behaviors of foreign 
agents. Moreover, the dual role of state being both the owner and the regulator may 
give birth to conflicts of interest (Bauer, 2003). Also, the question of whether public 
authority makes shareholders better off, as compared with private management, 
remains highly controversial. An overpaid (2,34 bn USD for the control stake) deal 
of PKN Orlenpurchasing Lithuanian Mažeikiairefinery (MažeikiųNafta) in 2006 would 
have probably never taken place if PKN Orlen had not been controlled by the State 
Treasury. The transaction was carried through due to political reasons, which were 
later confirmed by both Orlen’s executives and political leaders, but the refinery’s 
operations are significantly hampered by the anti-Polish activity of Russian oligarchs 
(Vitkus, 2009:31-33). 
On the borderline between exogenous and endogenous vested interests lies the 
ideological fragmentation of the political scene, i.e. the internal conflict of political 
elites, though existing as a consequence of inconclusive results of democratic 
elections. As Bortolotti and Pinotti (2008:18) argue, greater political fragmentation 
(precisely: the number of agents with veto power) is the factor entailing longer delays 
to implement large scale divestiture. The same is confirmed for economies 
considered developed, like Italy, where economic benefits from privatization have 
not been realized in full partly because of the ‘inherent weakness of the coalition 
governments that have run the country’ (Goldstein and Nicoletti, 2003:30). Needless 
to add, an unstable political setting is highly likely to arise in transition states (Lipton 
and Sachs, 1990:298-299; Stark, 1990; Šikulová and Frank, 2013:30). 
Consequently, at the very beginning of the transition route, foreign investors are 
usually concerned about huge political risks. They not only risk low returns, but also, 
if unlucky, may have their assets seized by the next government, after being accused 
of, say, illegitimate privatization (Stiglitz, 2002:144). Nevertheless, as Rattsø (2012) 
evidenced for Norway, political conflict there also raises the influence of interest 
groups around SOEs. The example of an abundant state struggling with the same 
shortcoming as transition economies adds up to the universality of this finding. On a 
related note, Imai (2009), who examined the privatization of Japan’s postal saving 
system, found robust evidence for incredibly complex legislative behavior with 
plethora of political factors involved and with conflicts not only between, but also 
within political parties. 
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After more than 20 years of successful market economy in Poland, the existence of 
state-owned banks, power plants, refineries and coal mines, in addition to still 
considerable amount of minority stakes, is difficult to apprehend. Since at the 
beginning of transition political agents may truly worry about layoffs and broadly 
understood social cost, these factors should diminish as time goes on (Agarwal and 
Nunnenkamp, 1992:18; Godoy and Stirlitz, 2006:18; Gupta, Ham and Svejnar, 
2008:188-189). Overall, exogenous sources of vested interests typically lie behind 
the relatively idealistic interpretation of government inactivity in terms of ownership 
transformation of SOEs. As Megginson and Netter (1998:7) put it, benevolent 
governments, in this optimistic view, act ‘in the (perceived) best interest of their 
citizenry’ and are reluctant to resign from control fearing that the private sector would 
fail in providing necessary (strategically important) goods at an acceptable cost. 
Using less lofty language, the government simply takes exogenous vested interests 
for granted. The next chapter shows that the driving force of government’s 
procrastination may equally well lie elsewhere. 
Endogenous sources of privatization aversion 
Despite the unambiguously important influence of civic dissatisfaction, resistance or 
anxiety towards privatization, a deal of effort in this paper is aimed at exploring the 
supply-side of privatization-related negligence. As we already know what societal 
convictions feed political agents and underpin their privatization aversion, let’s now 
investigate the endogenous factors that flourish solely within the political 
environment. This is along the lines of Olofsgård (2003:11) who insists that ‘vested 
interest groups do not necessarily come from outside’, but the resistance to reform 
may be produced within the political elite. Anti-privatization vested interests’ sources 
are twofold.  
The first cradle constitutes nomenklatura being somehow in charge of a given 
enterprise’s operations. They would oppose privatization as long as it takes in order 
to retain their own positions. Van de Walle (1989), who has not seen by then the 
post-communist privatization programs ‘in all their glory’, stated optimistically that 
political opposition to privatization is usually limited to the state bureaucracy. 
Although he also warned that this opposition may extend from corporate level to the 
level of the ministry overseeing this corporation, he rather failed to predict that these 
were politicians and not the bureaucracy that took the lead in impeding privatization 
as time went on. 
Hence, the second source is even more sustainable and also more sophisticated. 
Implicit knowledge instructs that having an umbrella over public enterprises is a 
valuable fringe benefit for politicians capable of taking advantage of it. Either directly 
or indirectly, supervisory boards of such entities are nominated by the ones currently 
in power. This creates boundless opportunities of appointing one’s close associates 
and allies, possibly incompetent or not caring about the business. Decent wage, 
prestige and almost sure windfall severance package in case the political landscape 
changes, and the purge led by new government reshuffles the lineup of supervisory 
or management board members. Assumingit is not very unlikely that the enterprise’s 
corporate governance may be rotten to the core, identical mechanism is due to be 
replicated downwards throughout the organizational chart, magnifying the impact of 
a political steering wheel.  
This renowned mechanism, coined as a “spoils system” (alternatively, “patronage 
system”), originated in the United States and reached its climax during Andrew 
Jackson’s presidency (1829-1837).However, it has been eradicated until nowadays, 
neither in Poland (see e.g. Majcherkiewicz and Gadowska, 2005; Nowakowski, 
2005; Gwiazda, 2008) nor in its cradle, the United States (see e.g. Lewis, 2009). 
Promises of positions in return for political support, e.g. during an electoral 
campaign, are not the only way to abuse one’s mandate. Politicians have in fact a 
broad portfolio of opportunities to endorse their proponents and temptations are all 
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around, multiplied by prospective kickbacks in the form of pure cash or campaign 
contributions. Moreover, Dinç and Gupta (2011) found country-specific evidencethat 
no firm located in the state from which the Indian minister comes from (one who has 
jurisdiction over that firm), was ever privatized. As a matter of fact, India’s overly 
bureaucratic and discretionary system was enough to create vested interests that 
prevented reform in the past decades (Singh, 2010:5). This result suggests that 
political patronage has a significant impact on the privatization decision. These 
mechanisms may be attenuated if politicians are restricted by the fear of private 
media coverage (Schoenman, 2005:50-51), but it materializes only provided that the 
abuse is evident and truly scandalous. The recent press coverage for Lubin, a 
headquarters of the state-owned giant KGHM, indicates that many local politicians 
sat in supervisory boards of KGHM or communal firms, although the remuneration 
taken from these firms has to be disclosed to the public, according to the domestic 
law (see Open Society Institute, 2002:418-419, for earlier instances of such 
misconducts). 
Politicians’ vested interests in Poland have been catalyzed for a long time via the 
“chimney bill” (limiting compensation for management in SOEs to six times the 
national average wage) that heavily curtailed top managers’ willingness to work for 
SOEs. According to DLA Piper, a global law firm, the bill of this kind was 
unprecedented in the European Union (money.pl, 2008). Therefore, it is not 
surprising that comparative literature in this matter is non-existent. The bill was 
essentially a deterrent for top-notch specialists, and an open invitation to appoint 
less endowed executives. When the shortlist of contenders is unimpressive, it is 
relatively easy to pick pre-agreed candidates. As noted by Bohdan Wyżnikiewicz 
from the Gdansk Institute for Market Economics, the pathway to state-controlled 
management boards was open for young and inexperienced rookies, ‘almost-
pensioners’ or those attracted by political careers (RynekInfrastruktury.pl, 2012). The 
same finding, though indirect and deprived of detailed description, was revealed 
even by the Ministry of Treasury in Poland (2005:124) in its annual report on 
privatization. The “chimney bill” was alleviated in 2010 by Donald Tusk’s 
government, privatizing quite eagerly as compared with preceding cabinets, though 
still exhibiting symptoms of excess procrastination. According to media reports, the 
“chimney bill” is now virtually “dead”, with top SOEs, such as 
PolskaGrupaEnergetyczna (PGE), Enea, Tauron, Polish State Railways (PKP), 
JastrzębskaSpółkaWęglowa (JSW) or KompaniaWęglowa, bypassing the bill by 
making use of “managerial contracts”. 
A separate issue in the context of SOEs is the rotation of CEOs, implying the lack of 
long-term strategic stability.For instance, the current CEO of LOT Polish Airlines is 
the eighth since 2005 (not counting the interim ones). Similarly, 
PaństwowyZakładUbezpieczeń (PZU) had six CEOs between 2001 and 2007, and 
KGHM PolskaMiedź (KGHM) had seven CEOs between 2001 and 2009. Whereas 
in a free market company, the management is preoccupied with profit maximization 
tasks, the management of a state-controlled entity, regardless of their will, is tied by 
motivations of political rather than economic nature. The managers of state-
controlled enterprise are expected to maintain advantageous relationships with their 
benefactors, as numerous studies have validated the importance of managerial 
political connections (Faccio, 2010; Hillman, 2005; Khwaja and Mian, 2005; Wu and 
Cheng, 2011). 
Bortolotti and Pinotti (2003:9) remind that it has already been largely documented 
that SOEs are a source of political rent for elected politicians, ‘who can interfere in 
the operating activity of the company in order to cater specific interest groups’. Later 
on, they urge about most common modi operandi. These may include e.g. keeping 
redundant workers to push away the threat of unemployment and earn voters’ 
admiration. This is what Rosa and Pérard (2010:112) would nickname as ‘interest-
group real politik’, while Boycko, Shleifer and Vishny (1996:310) argue that the 
spending politician may still be willing to subsidize a firm even after it is privatized, 
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with the intent to ‘buy’ excess labor spending. All of this despite the fact that 
employment rose and the working class was better off after privatization (Galal et al., 
1994; Megginson, Nash and van Randenborgh, 1994), contrary to anecdotal 
evidence. 
Bjørnskov and Potrafke (2011:206) remark that vested interests more typically 
pertain to left-wing governments. By the same token, Li and Lui (2004:212-213) 
argue that right-wing governments may have greater motivation in privatization or 
liquidation of SOEs, as this would weaken trade unions, their natural foe. In the light 
of the above mentioned arguments, Schindele’s (2003:13) view, underlining a 
substantial role of politicians’ interest in the privatization process, seems to be an 
accurate synopsis: ‘being able to use the basic trade-off between the costs of 
restructuring the economy and efficient privatization, politicians might obtain private 
benefits from hindering privatization’. 
Conventional versus emerging vested interests 
Traditional sources of vested interests include the temptation to forego economic 
rationality in exchange for “empire building” behaviors. Most of these issues can be 
viewed as classical principal-agent problems (Vickers and Yarrow, 1989). In the 
context of a non-privatized company, this boils down to three particular situations: 
• “pumping up” the size of the company, e.g. through unnecessary investments or 
foreign expansion, which lacks economic rationale; 
• the exploitation of sinecures, used to bolster one’s political influence; 
• unnecessary, non-austere perks for the management, such as luxurious 
limousines, leather armchairs, but also the new headquarters. For instance, one 
of the official Chinese reports, quoted by Cheng (2012:359) indicates that ‘in a 
lot of loss-making SOEs, where workers could not receive wages, managers 
paid themselves full wages, bonuses, and subsidies, and rode around in luxury 
cars’. 
The vested interests that may be deemed new to this universe are the following: 
• creating additional channels of political influence and expanding the catalogue 
of incentives, with which politicians may please their networks (e.g. tolerating 
extravagant activity in the area of corporate social responsibility, sports 
sponsorship arrangements, lavish marketing expenses); 
• proactive family employment (nepotism), of substantial value in the age of 
turbulent market environments. 
Shleifer and Vishny (1994:1024) argue that the privatization is most likely to occur 
when politicians cannot obtain large benefits from public firms any more. This is an 
apparently obvious axiom, but what the literature frequently omits is that political 
benefits, as shown above, may alter. For instance, once public opinion stops to 
accept politicians deriving a particular benefit from public firms, politicians might 
“invent” a new, less controversial genre of benefits. 
As it seems, the new vested interests display two traits. First, they are less 
unequivocal in terms of moral assessment, which means they are not 
unambiguously wrongdoings, at least at first glance. Such an inference is justified on 
the basis of a recent Public Opinion Research Center report (Centrum 
BadaniaOpiniiSpołecznej, 2012), where nepotism was not unequivocally despised. 
Second, they generally account for a more proactive role of the managers put in 
charge of the SOEs. In this view, the manager’s (endowed’s) vision is not solely the 
derivative of the politician’s (endower’s) vision. It is more independent and 
individualistic. 
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It is generally difficult to decide whether these two are more exogenous or 
endogenous vested interests. On the one hand, they are derivatives of the 
independence of SOEs’ management and as such, individuals in charge of SOEs 
are the main beneficiaries, enjoying prestige and respect. On the other hand, 
however, given complicated mutual relations and reciprocation schemes between 
politicians and their nominees, politicians do also have incentives to maintain a pool 
of attractive job posts to fill. And these two additional benefits undoubtedly add up to 
the attractiveness of managerial positions in SOEs. 
Illustrations of the problem 
One of the most prevalent bonuses associated with not privatized enterprises is the 
relatively convenient opportunity to spend money for non-business activity, including 
sports team ownership or sports sponsorship schemes. By participating in these, 
politicians associate themselves with positive emotions, playing the role of the “sugar 
daddy”. In the communist era, economic flows activated not only by regular and full-
fledged SOEs but also by state-owned farms on the more local level, aimed at 
supporting sport constituted an obvious necessity given no alternative source of 
financing (Andreff, 2008:23; Micek, Neo and Górecki, 2011:48). Contrary to the 
United States, where the so-called sports industry is resilient enough to secure vast 
resources, in much part of Europe the idea of subsidized sport outlived the 
totalitarian regimes. Nevertheless, public opinion is usually sensitive to the 
mismanagement of taxpayers’ money by a beneficiary sporting entity (Andreff, 
2006:9). 
Table 2. A summary of SOE-related sports sponsorship activities for key 
professional leagues in Poland. Note: names of companies were put in 
parentheses only if they are not included in club’s official name 
 Does SOE sponsors the league? Do SOEs sponsor particular clubs? 
Football Men No 
PGE GKS Bełchatów, RuchChorzów 
(Węglokoks), while KGHM ZagłębieLubin is 
fully owned by SOE 
Basketball Men 
Yes (Tauron Basket 
Liga) 
Energa Czarni Słupsk, PGE Turów 
Zgorzelec, Polpharma Starogard Gdański 
(Tauron), Stelmet Zielona Góra (PGNiG, 
PKP Energetyka) 
Women No EnergaToruń 
Volleyball 
Men No PGE Skra Bełchatów, Jastrzębski Węgiel (JSW), LOTOS Trefl Gdańsk 
Women Yes (ORLEN Liga) Atom Trefl Sopot (PGE), Tauron MKS Dąbrowa Górnicza 
Handball 
Men Yes (PGNiGSuperliga) OrlenWisłaPłock, AzotyPuławy, TauronStalMielec 
Women Yes (PGNiGSuperliga) KGHM Metraco Zagłębie Lubin, SPR Lublin (PGE) 
Source: proprietary analysis based on relevant corporate websites.  
It is not feasible to gather wide-ranging and accurate data on corporate involvement 
in sponsorship schemes. Even listed companies, although subject to rigorous 
discipline in terms of investor relations, do not have a duty to disclose such precise 
figures. This already should be a red flag for SOEs supervisors. Screening the yearly 
reports of twenty largest enterprises traded on the Warsaw Stock Exchange, reveals 
that whether firms share the details or not remains their discretionary choice. 
Nevertheless, Code of Best Practice for WSE Listed Companies (Warsaw Stock 
Exchange, 2011), updated 19 October 2011, says: ‘If a company supports different 
forms or artistic and cultural expression, sport activities, educational or scientific 
activities, and considers its activity in this area to be a part of its business mission 
and development strategy, impacting the innovativeness and competitiveness of the 
enterprise, it is good practice to publish, in a mode adopted by the company, the 
rules of its activity in this area.’ 
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This rule should be applied not later than 1 January 2013. Based on yearly reports 
covering 2011, SOEs most often conceal their activity in this field. Such giants as 
Orlen, PGNiG or PGE, known for their active participation in sponsorship schemes, 
do not mention a word on it in their reports. 
 
Table 3. A summary of 2011 management reports issued by the 20 largest 
companies on the Warsaw Stock Exchange (WIG20 is a capitalization-weighted 
stock market index) 
No. Company Treasurystake (direct) 
Free float  
(mil PLN) 
WIG20 
share 
Nature of involvement in sports, 
according to the 2011 official 
yearly report 
1 KGHM 31.79% 26,395 15.086% 
100% ownership in 
ZagłębieLubin S.A., 
management of football section, 
organization of professional 
sporting events, enlisted as part 
of CSR 
2 PKOBP 33.39% 24,036 13.738% Mentions several running events that the bank supported 
3 PZU 35.1875% 23,674 13.531% None 
4 PEKAO - 17,960 10.265% None 
5 PKNORLEN 27.52% 15,903 9.089% None 
6 PGE 61.89% 13,654 7.804% None 
7 PGNIG 73.50% 8,596 4.913% None 
8 TPSA - 8,092 4.625% None 
9 TAURONPE 30.06% 5,145 2.940% None 
10 BOGDANKA - 4,587 2.622% 
Admits that there is a separate 
advertizing budget dedicated to 
sports sponsorship (7,932,500 
PLN), along with the very broad 
clarification of why the sports 
sponsorship is important to the 
firm. The report enumerates 
clubs that have been supported. 
11 BRE - 4,162 2.378% None 
12 JSW 55.16% 3,612 2.064% None 
13 HANDLOWY - 3,247 1.856% None 
14 KERNEL - 3,231 1.847% None 
15 ASSECOPOL - 3,167 1.810% 
Mentions sponsorship 
agreements with AssecoProkom 
Gdynia (agreement set to expire 
on 31 July 2015) and 
AssecoResovia (until 31 May 
2014). 
16 SYNTHOS - 2,742 1.567% None 
17 LOTOS 53.18% 2,468 1.411% None 
18 GTC - 2,153 1.230% None 
19 TVN - 1,568 0.896% None 
20 BORYSZEW - 572 0.327% None 
Source: www.stooq.pl [accessed: 5 January 2013]; applicable corporate reports. 
Although sports sponsorship has been incorporated into the corporate marketing 
function over time (see Farrelly, Quester and Burton, 1997), there are doubts on 
whether the scope of support is not too lavish in the case of SOEs. There are also 
numerous examples of municipal firms, or municipalities directly, that sponsor 
professional sports. However, although controversial, this model does not lead to a 
geographical discrimination. Supporting the local team from local taxes may be 
considered as part of municipality’s strategy to attract new inhabitants to the town or 
to provide them with entertainment. On the contrary, country-wide SOEs, if they 
invest locally, discriminate against other locations, which are deprived of their own 
sports team. Cherry-picking local teams to support at the cost of other regions seems 
to be a breach of neutrality. Since corporations back professional teams more 
enthusiastically than amateur sports and physical activity in general, the underlying 
moral case to be tackled is even more pronounced. 
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Another problem associated with SOE-related vested interests is family employment. 
This not only concerns large nationwide corporations where such schemes are 
difficult to detect, but particularly the small-scale municipally-owned entities. Such a 
category usually comprises bus operators, waterworks companies, provision of 
public utilities, road maintenance or city cleaning services. In August 2012, 
“Rzeczpospolita” disclosed that 40 percent of Warsaw City Council members work 
for various governmental or self-governmental bodies. Overall, Polish mayors and 
heads of counties employ 250,000 people, whereas the central administration hires 
180,000. In the age of unemployment and bleak economic prospects, the ability to 
create jobs and hand-pick employees adds up much to the prestige of an official, 
who may derive rents and expect for reciprocation from those employed. It is not 
uncommon for the local governor to be a leading employer in a commune or in a 
county. 
Sixteen voivodeship capitals operate 280 municipally-owned entities (including 44 in 
Warsaw only). Municipally-owned firms are attractive to territorial governments, 
since in many cases they allow for hiding debt. Since Poland’s constitution caps debt 
to a pre-determined threshold, territorial governments have limited options for 
boosting their expenditures and thus municipally-owned entities become helpful in 
deceiving their true financial condition.In general, the privatization at the local level 
is a separate issue, with different set of incentives and disincentives. The level of 
complexity varies and while some scholars have found evidence that fiscal 
constraints, political and ideological considerations are decisive determinants of 
privatization policy (Bel and Fageda, 2009:116), others rather point out pragmatic 
concerns such as service quality (Warner and Hebdon, 2001). 
A scandal that broke out in 2012 around the Agency for Restructuring and 
Modernisation of Agriculture (ARiMR) is edifying. As it became clear for the public, 
the agency, whose task is particularly to transfer the EU agriculture funds to Polish 
beneficiaries, has numerous staff. Apart from the headquarters with 25 departments 
and 16 regional offices, there are 314 local offices. It has over 10,000 employees in 
total and a considerable potential for sinecure creation. Simultaneosuly, the 
Agricultural Market Agency (ARR), with tasks partially overlapping with ARiMR, hires 
1,200 people and – to make the picture full –there are additional 1,000 jobs in the 
already mentioned Agricultural Property Agency. 
Some theoretical explanation of the phenomenon of nepotism in SOEs is offered by 
Santalainen, Baliga and Leimann (2003:78-79), who underline that the need to 
adjust to the free market standards inevitably leads to the disruption of prevailing 
corporate norms and values, part of which is providing employment to friends and 
relatives. They also highlight the excess employment that typically prevails in SOEs, 
and wrote about the problem of altered ‘psychological contract’ that invades safety 
of employees and gives rise to their disappointment. Gabris and Simo (1995) tried 
to discern whether the career motivations of public sector employees and private 
sector employees are contradictory, which would partially explain the perplexity of 
SOEs’ employees when faced with privatization plans, but they did not arrive at any 
convincing results. 
Having said that, we may conclude that SOEs have become full-grown extensions 
of the regular public authority. State-owned business units serve no more solely to 
protect the country’s economic interest. The above mentioned case studies illustrate 
the multidimensional expansion of vested interests that indicates that they flourish 
rather than fall into decline. 
Precisely, the corollary from screening these several cases is that the magnitude of 
the phenomenon is considerable and the innovation in inventing and exploiting the 
new sources of vested interests fell into a habit of the Polish government, territorial 
governments and SOEs. Whereas public opinion has already learnt how to blow the 
whistle to condemn the SOEs’ behavior when conventional vested interests are 
manifested (which is not to say that these conventional sources are in decline), it still 
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does not have tools, or will, to face the new wave of spoils. The delicateness of sports 
sponsorship, CSR or nepotism is evident. Criticizing the sponsorship of “glorious” 
goals may sometimes fail to attract many admirers. Criticizing nepotism must make 
anybody think twice, whether the claimant herself and her closest relatives are above 
suspicion. In the interconnected world of politics and bureaucracy, sinlessness is in 
deficit. 
Conclusions and policy implications 
This paper recognizes vested interests as one of the primary premises that reduce 
the effectiveness of privatization policy, stall its momentum and produce structural 
problems in the long-run. Since empire building behaviors, creation of sinecures or 
extravagant management style have all been identified by scholars long ago, this 
paper strove to unravel more up-to-date, emerging and yet unexploited sources of 
vested interests. The channels through which conventional vested interests have 
snowballed over time were briefly described. Among this new set of privatization 
constraints, a closer look was cast at employing relatives and engaging in lavish 
sports sponsorship arrangements. The latter appears to be the favorite domain of 
marketing activity for Polish SOEs. 
Policy recommendations provided by the literature as regards the solution of the 
underlying deficiency read as follows. Alesina and Tabellini (2004:23) urge that if 
vested interests are in place, it is more efficient to let a non-elective bureaucrat 
handle a given problem than to have it retained by a politician, inherently vulnerable 
to voters’ rage. A similar argument emerges from the inferences of Earle and 
Gehlbach (2002:5), as the absence of an established reform-oriented constituency 
is likely to produce a backlash when the inevitable privatization-related short-term 
costs occur. To mitigate the risk of premature policy reversal, some kind of 
“insulation” of the polity from the public may be considered. Moreover, Bortolotti and 
Pinotti (2003:9) seem to have found that the electoral system is important: the ones 
with majoritarian systems perform better and politicians are less likely to pursue rent 
seeking behaviors, as compared with the system based on proportional 
representation. Schindele (2003:13) puts forward a solution, too: bargaining models 
of privatization suggest that ‘in order to achieve efficient privatization, corruption 
should be impossible and firms should face hard budget constraints’, which 
necessitates the full coverage of costs with revenues. In fact, neither of these 
conditions has ever been met in full in Poland. The issue of implementation of any 
guidelines in the underlying matter remains difficult, due to the self-policing problem 
(nemoiudex in causa sua). 
As far as the conclusions stemming directly from this paper are concerned, two policy 
recommendations seem justified. First, given no rapid privatization, the remuneration 
schemes in public enterprises call for amendment. The pattern of the compensation 
should be benchmarked to the market, reflecting the significance of the function, as 
well as ensure the appropriate level of motivation for the manager. The current 
“chimney bill”, approved in 2000 under the populist pressure, is by no means the 
replication of the stimulating free market remuneration plans. Naturally, this will exert 
a tangible impact on the minimization of interest group influence only if it suffices to 
attract top-notch independent managers to SOE, and if it is accompanied by a fair 
and unbiased manager selection process. Second, the multilateral improvement in 
transparency should be demanded. This may capture both the overt and detailed 
information of all marketing arrangements that SOEs take up (what has been partly 
stipulated by the already mentioned Code of Best Practice for WSE Listed 
Companies), as well as the disclosure of all relevant conflicts of interest that decision 
makers might have. As soon as such conflicts arise, a politician or a bureaucrat 
should be advised to dissociate from the decision making, since the quoted 
examples from India or Japan proved that the detachment of reason and the 
subordination to pressure group interests are quite common when vested interests 
come into play. The antidote for the expanding set of vested interests lies obviously 
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also in the ethical conduct of the ones in power, high standard of which being always 
deficient in transition economies. This, however, is the starting point for a completely 
different study. 
There are several directions in which further investigation into the roots of vested 
interests should proceed. First, the paramount challenge is measurement. The 
quantitative tools are of limited value due to the poor data sets, data opacity and 
problematic sampling. Methods of how to navigate this paucity need to be improved. 
Second, the issue of universality seems interesting. Since this paper tries to display 
the Polish pattern of petrifying vested interests, it does not aspire to be considered 
ubiquitous. Third, the actual strength and durability of vested interests in the various 
stages of privatization processes is interesting. With regard to the last proposal, two 
hypotheses may be crafted to stimulate future research. One, vested interests have 
limited impact on the very beginning of transformation, when reformist enthusiasm 
is larger. Two, the nature of vested interests changes over time and new ones crowd 
out the older ones, what was partially argued in this paper. 
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